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Abstract
Immigration is highly salient for voters in Europe and the United States and has
generated considerable academic debate about the causes of preferences over im-
migration. This debate centers around the relative influences of sociotropic or
personal economic considerations, as well as non-economic threats. We provide a
test of the competing egocentric, sociotropic, and non-economic paradigms using a
novel constrained preference experiment in which respondents are asked to trade-off
preferred reductions in immigration levels with realistic estimates of the personal
or societal costs associated with those reductions. This survey experiment, per-
formed on a national sample of British YouGov panelists, allows us to measure the
price-elasticity of the public’s preferences with regard to levels of European and
non-European immigration. Respondents were willing to admit more immigrants
when restriction carries economic costs, with egocentric considerations as important
as sociotropic ones. People who voted for the UK to Leave the European Union
in the 2016 referendum are less price-elastic than those voting Remain, indicating
that non-economic concerns are also important.
Words: 4,025
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Are people who prefer lower immigration levels sensitive to the economic costs of
reducing immigration? This question is particularly relevant in Britain in light of ongoing
debate over Britain’s exit from the European Union. Immigration has become increasingly
salient since 2013 in many European countries and in the United States and has ranked
among the top three issues for voters since 2002 (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014), making it
a uniquely persistent topic of political importance. We examine the connection between
preferred immigration reductions and their economic costs through a novel constrained-
preference survey experiment that adds to the scholarly understanding of immigration
preferences in several important ways. We find economic considerations may matter
more than generally thought as inhibitors of restrictionist policy preferences, and that
egocentric economic motives can be as important as sociotropic ones in shaping these
preferences.
Previous analyses of immigration attitudes support cultural threat and sociotropic
economic explanations — those regarding the economy as a whole — over egocentric ma-
terial interests such as threats to one’s own standing in the labor market (Hainmueller
and Hiscox 2010). On the cultural side, living near refugee processing centres or in-
habiting ethnically-changing neighbourhoods or countries tends to lead to more negative
attitudes to immigrants and a preference for lower levels of immigration (Newman 2013;
Lubbers 2006; Enos 2014). Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) show, by manipulating
the skin tone and ethnicity of an immigrant, that white Americans prefer European to
non-European immigrants.
Sociotropic economic considerations are also seen as important. When asked about
the reasons why they oppose immigration, many respondents cite competition for jobs
or pressure on public services (Sides and Citrin 2007). Studies repeatedly find that
respondents favor high-skilled over low-skilled immigrants (Bansak, Hainmueller, and
Hangartner 2016). Panel studies, however, find no evidence that the economic cycle
affects immigration opinion, but do find that changes in the stock of immigrants predicts
opposition over time (Hatton 2016).
Deploying an innovative methodology designed to assess implicit cost constraints
on immigration attitudes, we test the competing sociotropic or egocentric economic
paradigms, as well as the role of non-economic motivations. We use a novel constrained-
preference experiment conducted on a national sample of UK adults to investigate the
public’s preferences over levels of European and non-European immigration. Rather
than correlate economic considerations with immigration preferences in the unconstrained
manner typical of most existing research, we force respondents to make a trade-off be-
tween lowering immigration and foregoing economic benefits. This approach reflects the
observation by Kuklinski et al. (2001, 414) that “to the extent that citizens can express
trade-offs explicitly and realistically, they will give policymakers informative signals about
their priorities.” Trade-offs, beyond measures of stated favorability or opposition toward
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immigration, more accurately reflect what citizens might want in realistic policy terms.
Attitudes toward Immigration
In light of the United Kingdom’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union, polling finds
that British citizens want both reduced immigration and improved economic growth. Op-
position to immigration is particularly striking among “Leave” voters (Clarke, Goodwin,
and Whiteley 2017) and polling indicates that nearly half (45%) of British citizens would
be unsatisfied with a Brexit outcome that continued to allow freedom of movement for
EU citizens in order to retain Single Market access.1
Despite the prevalence of these restrictionist attitudes, there remain open questions
about the degree to which an apparently unconditional opposition to migration may be
affected by the economic costs that actually come with attenuating immigration levels.
Indeed, it would appear that many British citizens favor reducing immigration and re-
taining access to the Single Market (43% believe the EU should offer a free trade deal
without guaranteeing freedom of movement)2 despite this combination of policies being
highly unlikely to emerge from the Brexit negotiations. This “cake and eat it” set of
preferences highlights a limitation of traditional survey research, which permits citizens
to express separate attitudes on what are ultimately inseparable preferences (Lacy 2001).
We ask: are citizens willing to pay a (personal or societal) cost in order to defend
a largely symbolic attitude such as opposition to immigration? The LSE’s Centre for
Economic Performance suggests, citing data from Boubtane, Dumont, and Rault (2015),
that “cutting EU immigrants to 80,000 per year [half of current levels] is likely to shave
0.16% off productivity growth (Wadsworth et al. 2016). So about a decade after Brexit,
UK GDP per capita will be about 1.6% lower than it would have otherwise been.” By
those numbers, cutting EU immigration entirely would lower GDP per capita by more
than 3% by 2030. Opposition to immigration necessarily means an economic cost, even
if citizens do not know it. One study suggests that approximately 35% of Leave voters
would be willing to pay 5% of their personal income to reduce EU immigration to zero,
but 6 in 10 voters are unwilling to sacrifice any income to reduce immigration Kaufmann
(2017). This research tested whether egocentric economic considerations affect views on
EU immigration but did not ask how respondents might trade off between immigration
levels and sociotropic economic costs, nor did it ask about non-EU immigration. We do
just this, comparing egocentric and sociotropic economic concerns, as well as preferred
EU and non-EU immigration levels.
1http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-news-brexit-expectations-poll/
2YouGov. 2016. “European voters reject ‘generous deal’ with UK post-Brexit”. https://yougov.
co.uk/news/2016/07/08/european-voters-reject-generous-deal/.
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Theory and Expectations
Our goal is to know what the public’s preferred level of net EU and non-EU immigration
to the UK is, and what economic costs individuals are willing to pay to achieve that.
Our expectations are straightforward. We are interested in two types of economic costs:
egocentric (personal costs) and sociotropic (costs to society as a whole) and two types of
immigration (EU and non-EU). Thus we expect:
H1: The imposition of a sociotropic cost in terms of foregone national Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) will make citizens more favorable toward higher levels of immigration
(i.e., immigration levels closer to the status quo).
H2: The imposition of an egocentric cost on personal income will make citizens more
favorable toward higher levels of immigration (i.e., immigration levels closer to the status
quo).
H3: Raising sociotropic (H3a) or egocentric (H3b) costs from a low cost to high cost will
further increase favorability toward higher levels of immigration.
Thus we anticipate that shifting the cost of achieving zero-net immigration from 5% of
GDP to 10% of GDP should further increase favorability toward immigration. Given
that the literature suggests sociotropic costs matter more for immigration opinion than
egocentric costs, we further expect that:
H4: Sociotropic costs in terms of foregone GDP will have a larger effect than the ego-
centric cost of lost household income in convincing respondents to accept higher levels
immigration.
Design and Methods
To measure preferences toward immigration when constrained by cost, we rely on a survey
experiment that presents this trade-off graphically and allows respondents to express
their desired reduction in net immigration (between no reduction and 100% reduction),
constrained by an associated economic cost. We benchmark these constrained preferences
using a within-subjects design that first measures individuals’ unconstrained preferences
for levels of EU and non-EU immigration.
The design then involves two subsequent manipulations. First, we randomly assign
individuals to either an egocentric condition where economic costs are expressed in terms
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Table 1: Experimental Design and Sample Sizes
Egocentric Sociotropic
High Cost 1 (n=897) 2 (903)
Low Cost 3 (914) 4 (922)
of % of personal income or a sociotropic condition where costs are in terms of GDP
per capita. This provides within-subjects tests of H1 and H2 (comparing constrained
preferences to unconstrained preferences). Second, we test H3 by further randomizing
individuals to either a “high cost” or “low cost” tradeoff curve, which adjusts the absolute
cost associated with various reduced levels of immigration. The high cost condition
imposes a 10% cost (of GDP or personal income) for bringing net immigration to zero;
the low cost condition imposes a 5% cost.
We test H3 and H4 through a 2x2 factorial design (4 conditions total; see Table 1).
We repeat the experiment separately for EU and non-EU immigration, with the order of
EU/non-EU immigration questions randomized.
We also ask a manipulation check to assess respondents’ acceptance of the cost trade-
off: “Do you believe the economic costs of reducing immigration that you just read are
just about right, or do you think reducing immigration will be much more costly or much
less costly?” with a five-point scale from “Much more costly” to “Much less costly”, or
“Don’t know”.
Finally, we also included a separate two-condition experiment measuring preferences
for a relative balance of EU and non-EU immigrants, where the manipulation entailed
the inclusion or exclusion of an explicit statement of current relative levels (“Currently
37% of all immigrants to the UK are from the EU and the rest are from Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and the rest of the world.”).
Our main outcome measure is simply respondents’ preferred immigration levels,∑ni=1 Lin ,
where Li is the preferred level of immigration for respondent i, among n total respon-
dents. Because our design only allows respondents to express preferences for lower levels
of net immigration (from 0 fewer immigrants to 165,000 fewer bringing total net immi-
gration to zero), we can also state these preferred levels as preferred reductions, such that
Ri = 165000− Li for each respondent, separately for EU and non-EU immigration.
The causal effects of interest are the differences in preferred immigration levels across
the various cost counterfactuals, such as the high sociotropic cost and low sociotropic
cost conditions:
n1∑
i=1
Li,High Sociotropic
nHigh Sociotropic
−
n0∑
j=1
Lj,Low Sociotropic
nLow Sociotropic
(1)
separately for EU and non-EU immigration. We can estimate this effect as a difference-
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in-differences of within-subject changes between unconstrained (t = 0) and constrained
(t = 1) preference measures between experimental conditions:
n∑
i=1
Li,Low Egocentric,t=1 − Li,Unconstrained,t=0
nLow Egocentric
−
n∑
j=1
Lj,Low Sociotropic,t=1 − Lj,Unconstrained,t=0
nLow Sociotropic
(2)
The within-subject differences provide for tests of H1 and H2, and these differences-in-
differences provide for tests of H3 and H4. We estimate effects for the high personal cost,
high sociotropic cost, and low personal cost against the low sociotropic cost condition as
a baseline, using OLS regression:
Difference = β0 + β1Low Egocentric + β2High Sociotropic + β3High Egocentric (3)
The intercept, β0, is an estimate of the impact of low sociotropic costs on preferred levels
of immigration — a positive value would be consistent with H1 such that respondents
display preferences for higher levels of immigration when reductions are costly.3 β1 es-
timates Equation 2. To the extent that β1, β2, and β3 are statistically distinguishable
from zero, costs induce preferences for lower (if negative) or higher (if positive) levels of
immigration than the low sociotropic cost.4
Most of our analysis focuses on preferred levels of EU and non-EU immigration and
overall (summing preferences for both types). We further describe differences in pref-
erences among Leave and Remain voters and voters of different socioeconomic classes.
Though not causally intepretable, we expect respondents will accept a higher level of EU
than non-EU immigration and, given that Leave voting in the 2016 referendum on EU
membership appears more linked to authoritarianism and conservatism than economic
concerns (Kaufmann 2017), we anticipate Leave voters should be more reluctant than
Remain voters to relax their immigration preferences in the face of costs.
Data Collection
Data were gathered by YouGov through two separate waves of their online “Omnibus”
panel (26 April and 2 May, 2017, ten months after the Brexit vote). The Omnibus
panel is a non-probability panel of respondents who complete surveys in exchange for
reward points. From this panel, respondents are selected using quota methods to reflect
the composition of the UK population with respect to age, sex, education, and region.
3One could, alternatively, think of this effect as a positive value implying a preference for a smaller
reduction in immigration levels when reductions are costly.
4Positive coefficients mean costs lead to preferences for smaller reductions compared to present levels
and negative coefficients would mean costs lead to preferences for larger reductions compared to present
levels.
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Figure 1: Preferred Reductions in EU and non-EU Immigration, Unconstrained or Con-
strained by Egocentric or Sociotropic Costs
Given the panel, we are able to rely on profile measures of respondents’ characteristics:
age, gender, social class, education, region, party identification, vote history (general
election and EU membership referendum). n = 3, 636 respondents completed the survey
and analyses are weighted according to poststratification weights (targetting UK census
demographics) provided by YouGov.
Results
Respondents are in favor of substantial reductions in net immigration. Against the current
330,000 net annual immigrants — 165,000 net migrants from both the EU and outside the
EU — the preferred reductions in immigration are substantial. On average, respondents
prefer a reduction in EU immigration from 165,000 to 73,775 per year, a drop of 91,325
(SE=1201) and a reduction in non-EU immigration from 165,000 to 59,689, a drop of
105,311 (SE=1115). This adds up to preferring a level of net annual immigration of
around 133,000, equal to about 40% of current levels. Figure 1 reports these reductions
in EU and non-EU immigration levels under unconstrained and constrained conditions.
The unconstrained conditions show the preference for lower levels of both non-EU and
EU immigration.5
5We also attempted to directly measure respondents’ preferred balance of EU and non-EU immigra-
tion using a separate experimental measure described in the previous section. Respondents preferred
53% non-EU to 47% EU immigration. This pattern did not respond to an experimental treatment pro-
viding accurate information on the current balance. Thus respondents directly report preferences for
substantially lower non-EU immigration than EU immigration, but their preferences diverge from this
pattern when asked to think in terms of relative shares.
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Table 2: Treatment Effects, Full Sample
Change in Preferred Immigration Levels
EU Non-EU All
5% Personal Income −75.0 884.6 571.7
(2, 529.6) (2, 625.5) (4, 521.8)
10% GDP 2, 078.2 −795.5 1, 386.7
(2, 431.2) (2, 683.3) (4, 516.2)
10% Personal Income 5, 202.6∗ 5, 074.8 11, 023.8∗
(2, 596.6) (2, 696.9) (4, 676.8)
Constant 9, 020.3∗ 19, 218.9∗ 27, 798.1∗
(1, 675.7) (1, 770.6) (3, 001.8)
Observations 2,531 2,527 2,488
Log Likelihood -30,672.3 -30,764.3 -31,630.6
Akaike Inf. Crit. 61,352.7 61,536.6 63,269.2
Note: * p < 0.05
These are estimates of Equation 3, separately for EU (column 1) and Non-EU (column
2) immigration, and a pooled estimate (column 3). The outcome is a within-subject shift
in preferred immigration levels (cost-constrained preference - unconstrained preference).
The positive constant in each case indicates that the imposition of a low sociotropic
costs increases preferred immigration levels. The remaining coefficients are differences-
in-differences against that baseline condition (as in Equation 2).
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The constrained conditions in Figure 1 show how individuals’ preferences change in
the face of low or high personal or sociotropic costs. Table 2 reports estimates of these
differences-in-differences. In the low-cost, societal condition (represented by the con-
stant term in these specifications), respondents respond by accepting 9,000 more EU
immigrants and 20,000 more non-EU immigrants per year. This result is strongly consis-
tent with our expectation that sociotropic costs will shift preferences in favor of higher
immigration levels (H1). Keeping in mind that respondents initially preferred higher
reductions in non-EU than EU immigration, the larger effect of low societal costs for
non-EU than EU immigrants (the constants in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) mean that
costs equalize preferences for levels of EU and non-EU immigration.
Asking respondents to consider a personal rather than sociotropic cost yields similar
effects, consistent with H2. The difference-in-differences between the low societal cost and
low personal cost conditions (the first row of coefficients in Table 2) are not statistically
distinguishable from zero, indicating that sociotropic and personal costs have similar
effects on preferred immigration levels.
We expected higher costs would magnify these effects (H3), yet the differences-in-
differences for the high cost conditions do not paint a consistent story. Increasing costs
from 5% to 10% of GDP does not lead to significantly larger increases in preferred levels
than the sociotropic cost condition (disconfirming H3a).6 Yet, higher personal costs do
yield a significantly larger shift (consistent with H3b) for EU immigration levels.7
One possibility, of course, is that the egocentric costs manipulations were simply
more evocative than the sociotropic, rather than an inherently meaningful difference in
the influence of these two types of costs. Evaluating these results as a whole in light
of the literature, which strongly expects sociotropic costs to be more consequential than
egocentric costs in moving immigration preferences, we see no clear evidence for this
(disconfirming H4). It is also possible respondents were unwilling to believe the cost
estimates we provided. On our manipulation check, many respondents indicated they did
not know the costs of immigration reductions; among those who provided a substantive
answer, there was little variation across conditions in shares of respondents believing the
costs were higher or lower than we implied. While respondents were somewhat more skep-
tical about the 10% personal income cost than the other stimuli, substantial proportions
of respondents in every condition thought the costs we reported were “just about right”
and majorities thought costs were even higher than we estimated so we are reasonably
certain most respondents “took” the treatments at face value.
Whose preferences are shifting? Figure 2 provides a visual summary of the individual-
level relationship between unconstrained preferences (x-axis) and cost-constrained pref-
6Though the estimated coefficient is positive for EU immigration, it does not reach conventional levels
of statistical significance; the effect for non-EU immigration is the opposite of what is expected by H3a.
7The estimate for Non-EU immigration is also positively signed but with a t-statistic of 1.88.
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Figure 2: Preferred Constrained and Unconstrained Levels of Immigration, EU and non-
EU Combined
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Figure 3: Preferred Constrained and Unconstrained Levels of Immigration, EU and non-
EU Separated
erences (y-axis) for total net immigration; the solid black line represents the line y = x.
The LOESS curve shows how cost constraints shift preferences among those with vary-
ing degrees of preferred immigration. Respondents who prefer close to zero net annual
migration (lower left area of figure) substantially shift their preferences once costs are
imposed, as evidenced by the vertical shift in the curve in the lower half of the preference
distribution.8 This general pattern also holds separately for EU and non-EU immigration
(see Figure 3). Reminding citizens of the reality that reducing immigration comes with
economic constraints moves the preferences of the most restrictionist individuals rather
than those with preferences for more moderate reductions. These individuals appear will-
ing to compromise their preferred immigration level to limit personal or social economic
harm, something not obvious from asking them solely for their unconstrained preferences
over immigration numbers.
We further consider how preferences vary along salient personal characteristics: namely
those who voted Leave and Remain in the 2016 referendum and those of varying socioe-
conomic status. Leave voters’ unconstrained preferences were for a reduction in total
net annual immigration of 249,081 (SE=2313) per annum, down to 25% of current levels.
Remain voters were more favorable toward immigration but still favored a large reduction
of 134,972 (SE=3128) in the unconstrained context, down to 59% of current levels. De-
spite these differences in unconstrained preferences, their price-elasticities appear to be
similar. Table 3 provides a summary of treatment effects by referendum vote. Both Leave
and Remain voters appear sensitive to costs, with Remain voters particularly sensitive
to high personal costs.
8A ceiling dynamic prevents those whose unconstrained preferences match the status quo from ex-
pressing preference for even higher net migration once costs are imposed.
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Table 3: Treatment Effects, by Referendum Vote
Change in Preferred Immigration Levels
Leave Remain
5% Personal Income −2, 083.2 6, 324.7
(6, 003.2) (6, 508.0)
10% GDP 4, 767.8 4, 076.5
(6, 551.9) (6, 387.7)
10% Personal Income 4, 724.0 22, 151.3∗
(6, 757.3) (6, 888.1)
Constant 28, 178.6∗ 24, 460.5∗
(4, 393.8) (4, 113.5)
Observations 1,164 1,117
Log Likelihood -14,731.6 -14,239.3
Akaike Inf. Crit. 29,471.3 28,486.6
Note: * p < 0.05
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We might also expect individuals in a lower socioeconomic position to be more sen-
sitive to cost considerations; alternatively those on higher incomes might feel the loss of
a percentage of higher income more keenly. Results available in the Appendix indicate
that all class groups are responsive to cost constraints and the effect sizes are generally
quite similar. Notable, however, is that the lower middle class are particularly sensitive
to costs — a 10% income cost triggers an average shift in favor of nearly 50,000 addi-
tional immigrants per year. By and large, however, it would appear that working class
individuals are not particularly sensitive to costs — if anything, the opposite.
Conclusion
We sought to quantify the degree to which citizens’ preferred immigration levels are sen-
sitive to economic costs. We introduced a novel constrained preference measure that ties
preferences for levels of immigration to associated costs of obtaining those levels. While
we find that Britons prefer a reduction in immigration, the constrained measure leads
restrictionist respondents to accept somewhat higher immigration levels. This suggests
that economic concerns may be better theorized as inhibitors rather than drivers of immi-
gration restriction. Yet, economic threat cannot be ruled out. Future research using our
method might ask whether choice constraints involving various levels of income inequality
or pressure on services alter individuals’ preferred migration levels; or, the measurement
approach we use might be effectively deployed in the studying cost constraints of other
policy issues. We also find that despite the widespread evidence that British citizens op-
pose EU immigration, unconstrained opposition to EU migration is lower than opposition
to non-EU immigration. This hints at the importance of ethnocultural motivations (see
also Kaufmann 2018), something that merits further research.
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A Supplemental Tables
Table A1. Treatment Effects, Alternative Analysis
Preferred Immigration Levels (Cost-Constrained)
EU Non-EU All
Unconstrained 0.7∗ 0.7∗ 0.8∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
5% Personal Income −1, 058.9 −380.1 −1, 975.0
(4, 428.8) (4, 290.9) (8, 176.0)
10% GDP 975.7 −1, 790.2 −28.1
(4, 276.8) (4, 311.4) (8, 122.4)
10% Personal Income 8, 575.7 7, 213.8 16, 823.6∗
(4, 568.2) (4, 411.3) (8, 397.2)
Unconstrained * 5% Personal Income 0.003 0.004 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Unconstrained * 10% GDP −0.01 −0.002 −0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Unconstrained * 10% Personal Income −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant 29, 517.7∗ 35, 968.0∗ 59, 179.4∗
(2, 959.7) (2, 928.2) (5, 579.1)
Observations 2,531 2,527 2,488
Log Likelihood -30,496.5 -30,624.8 -31,503.0
Akaike Inf. Crit. 61,009.1 61,265.7 63,021.9
Note: * p < 0.05
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Table A2. Treatment Effects, by Social Grade
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Table A3. Treatment Effects, by 2015 General Election Vote
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Figure A1. Preferred Constrained and Unconstrained Levels of Immigration,
by Referendum Vote
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Figure 4: Unconstrained Preferences Question Screenshot
B Screenshots
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Figure 5: Constrained Preferences Question Screenshot
20
Figure 6: Manipulation Check: Perceived Cost of Reducing Immigration, by Treatment
C Manipulation Check
Figure 6 provides a simple visual summary of responses to our manipulation check ques-
tion that asked respondents whether the costs of reducing immigration would be much
more costly or much less costly than our stimuli implied.
D Question Wordings
Full question wordings are as follows:
According to government statistics, about 3 million European Union citizens and 5 mil-
lion non-EU citizens live in the United Kingdom. Annually, net migration from the
EU is 165,000 and net migration from elsewhere (mainly Asia, Africa and the Middle
East) is also 165,000. This means that 330,000 more people move to the UK each year
than leave.
We would like to know how much net migration you would prefer to have from the EU
and from elsewhere. Please indicate your preferences as a number: choosing “0” would
mean cutting net migration to zero, while choosing “165,000” means keeping levels as
they are currently.
How much net migration should there be from the EU?
Slider scale between 0 and 165,000
How much net migration should there be from outside the EU?
Slider scale between 0 and 165,000
[PAGE BREAK]
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No one knows what will happen, but if reducing EU immigration were to result in a cost
to [personal income][Gross Domestic Product, a measure of economic well-being], how
much net migration should there be from the EU?
Imagine that reducing net EU immigration by 165,000 per year will cost [5%][10%] of
[personal income][Gross Domestic Product, a measure of economic well-being]. Reducing
it by a lower amount will cost less. Given the economic costs you would pay to reduce
EU immigration, how much net migration should there be from the EU?
As before, please indicate your preference as a number, where “0” would mean cutting
net migration to zero and choosing “165,000” means keeping levels as they are currently.
High cost condition:
Slider scale between 0 and 165,000; with additional economic numbers where 0 = -10%
and 165,000 = -0%
Low cost condition:
Slider scale between 0 and 165,000; with additional economic numbers where 0 = -5%
and 165,000 = -0%
PAGE BREAK
[Same question repeated for immigrants from outside the EU] Imagine that reducing net
EU immigration by 165,000 per year will cost [5%][10%] of [personal income][Gross Do-
mestic Product, a measure of economic well-being]. Reducing it by a lower amount will
cost less. Given the economic costs you would pay to reduce EU immigration, how much
net migration should there be from outside the EU?
[Same response scales as previous question]
PAGE BREAK
Do you believe the economic costs of reducing immigration that you just read are just
about right, or do you think reducing immigration will be much more costly or much less
costly?
Much more costly
A bit more costly
Just about right
A bit less costly
Much less costly
Don’t know
PAGE BREAK
Reducing EU immigration will affect the percentage of all immigrants that come from
Europe as opposed to Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the rest of the world. [Currently
37% of all immigrants to the UK are from the EU and the rest are from Asia, Africa, the
Middle East, and the rest of the world.] What percentage of all immigrants would to the
UK would you like to see coming from the EU?
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Slider scale between 0 and 100; 0 labeled 0% EU and 100% non-EU; 100 labeled 100%
EU and 0% non-EU
Control condition: defaults to blank
Treatment condition: defaults to 37%
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